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Easement And Partial Taking
Valuation Problems
By RicHARD A. CLARKE*
THE rules for valuing property taken in a condemnation action
depend upon a number of factors, some of the more important of
which are: (1) The nature of the property right which the condemn-
ing agency is seeking, i.e., whether a fee simple, easement, or other
right such as one for view or access; (2) the nature of the ownership
from which the condemnor takes; and (3) whether the property or
rights in property taken constitute the owner's entire ownership or
merely a portion of a larger property. The purpose of this article is
to review and discuss the rules relating to the valuation of the prop-
erty taken (a) where easements are imposed by the public agency
upon the owner's land, (b) where an owner's easement appurtenant is
condemned, and (c) where the property taken is part of a larger
parcel. Unfortunately, little has been written on the aspects of valu-
ing condemned property under these situations, although they arise
all too frequently.
I. Easements
A. Method of Valuation When an Easement Is Imposed Upon Property
by the Public Agency
Public agencies are entitled to condemn either a fee simple or the
lesser estate of an easement for necessary public purposes.' Public
utility corporations, districts, and cities frequently condemn easements
for water lines, sewer lines, and gas and electric lines. In determin-
ing what the public agency should pay for these utility easements,
the first issue to be resolved is the nature of the easement sought,
and how it will limit or restrict the fee owner's use of the land.
The scope of utility easements is often clearly defined by the
pleadings, which may set forth in express terms all the rights the
agency will use and what restrictions, if any, will be imposed on the
use of the land by the owner of the underlying fee. The complaint
* Member, Marin County Bar.
The situations in which a fee simple may be condemned for public use
have been codified. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1239. In other situations, how-
ever, easements are all that can be condemned. See Tuolumne Water Power
Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 110 P. 134 (1910).
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may show that the condemnor expressly seeks to prohibit the place-
ment of structures upon the easement and to impose certain second-
ary easements such as one permitting entry for maintenance, inspec-
tion and repair. On the other hand, the agency may ask only for an
underground easement for "water line" or "sewer" purposes. Which-
ever type of easement is sought, if the utility in its complaint and
judgment does not spell out the restrictions and limitations it wishes
to impose upon the use of the land, in addition to whatever secondary
easements are sought, the easement acquired will be a general one and
will, therefore, contain substantial rights.2 For example, a general
easement for a sewer line carries with it by implication all those
secondary easements which are necessary and incidental to the en-
joyment of the granted easement.3
The courts will go to great lengths to protect a utility easement
because of the dangers and inconvenience to the public involved in a
disruption of utility service. 4 For example, vehicles parked within an
easement, as well as fences across the easement, have been considered
"obstructions" to a power line easement. 5 A pile of dirt has been
considered a prohibited "structure," 6 as have swimming pools and
patios.7 The maintenance of such "structures" over underground
pipes or within power line easements, in essence, have been held to be
inconsistent with the easement rights of the public utility and, there-
fore, prohibited uses of the property by the owner of the underlying
fee. While the restrictions in the above cases were contained in the
easement grants themselves, the same results could have been ob-
tained under general provisions of easement law even in the absence
of such express restrictions.8
If the condemnor is unwilling to define its easement with any
specificity in its complaint or testimony,9 the law will presume that
2 See Haley v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 59 Cal. App.
2d 285, 342 P.2d 476 (1959); Hamaker v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 59 Cal. App.
642, 211 P. 265 (1922); cf. Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co.,
17 Cal. 2d 576, 110 P.2d 983 (1941).
s See cases cited note 2 supra.
4 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Mateo County, 233 Cal. App. 2d
268, 43 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1965); Los Angeles v. Jameson, 165 Cal. App. 2d 351,
331 P.2d 1014 (1958); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Minnette, 115 Cal. App. 2d
698, 252 P.2d 642 (1953).
5 Los Angeles v. Inga, 208 Cal. App. 2d 338, 25 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1962).
6 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Mateo County, 233 Cal. App. 2d 268,
43 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1965).
7 Cf. Ajax-Magnolia Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d
743, 334 P.2d 1053 (1959).
8 The courts will favor an interpretation of an easement grant which
permits the fulfillment of its purposes. See Ajax-Magnolia Co. v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 743, 334 P.2d 1053 (1959).
9 The public agency may present evidence on the nature of its improve-
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the most extensive and damaging use will be made of the easement
by the agency, including the exercise of necessary secondary ease-
ments and necessary restrictions on inconsistent uses by the owner
of the underlying fee.10 Furthermore, once the agency has acquired
an easement the owner is precluded from later obtaining additional
compensation for the district's exercise of rights which were neces-
sarily included among the original rights obtained.1 This is true
whether the original rights were obtained by grant or by condemna-
tion judgment.12 It is incumbent, therefore, on the property owner's
attorney to develop sufficient information concerning the easement,
including its express and implied terms, so that the owner is com-
pensated for all rights which the agency obtains. If the condemna-
tion judgment specifically limits the extent of use and terms of the
easement, the agency must pay additional compensation if it seeks to
modify or expand its rights at a later time.' s An instruction to the
jury should be given, therefore, which comprehensively defines the
easement rights and restrictions so that the jury will know exactly
what it is valuing.
Once the nature and extent of the easement have been estab-
lished, it is then necessary to apply the proper formula for measur-
ing the effect of this taking of specific easement rights from the fee
owner. Unfortunately, the California Evidence Code itself does not
refer to the taking of easements. 14 Moreover, since sales of interests
ment, the way it will be constructed, maintained and operated, and the land
owner cannot challenge or impeach such testimony. CAL. EVIDMNcE COD.
§ 813. By specifying the details of its improvement, the agency will only be
liable for those damages which flow from the improvement as detailed. See
People v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954); cases cited
note 13 infra.
10 People v. Lundy, 238 Cal. App. 2d 354, 47 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1965); People
v. Logan, 198 Cal. App. 2d 581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1961); Sanitation Dist. No. 2
v. Averill, 8 Cal. App. 2d 556, 47 P.2d 786 (1935); East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v.
Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 8 P.2d 532 (1932).
"1 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965); Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 211 Cal. 670,
296 P. 1088 (1931); Lourence v. West Side Irr. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 532,
43 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1965); Steines v. Sutter-Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737,
216 P. 66 (1923).
12 Albers v. Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965); Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 211 Cal. 670,
296 P. 1088 (1931).
18 People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960);
People v. Pera, 190 Cal. App. 2d 497, 12 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1961); People v.
Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).
14 The classical approaches to value and the matters upon which an ap-
praisal can be based have been set forth by the Legislature. CAL. EviNc.
CODS §§ 814-20. However, none of these sections refer to easement valuation
methods or even to specific matters to be considered in easement valuation
cases.
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to. entities with the power of eminent domain are expressly inadmis-
sible,15 and since almost all easement rights are purchased by public
entities under the power of eminent domain, it is extremely difficult
to find open market transactions which are admissible to indicate the
value of easements.
It has also been held that where the easement sought is the right
to use the surface of the land, the value of the underlying fee is only
nominal and the value of the easement is essentially the value of the
fee.16 This rule is applied where highway and railroad rights of way
are involved, since such uses preclude any other use by the owner of
the underlying fee. Under such circumstances, the fee owner has, in
essence, only a right of reverter, which in most cases can be only of
nominal value.1 7
However, where rights of substantial value will remain with the
owner of the underlying fee the public agency is not bound to pay the
full value of the land taken.' s Such rights generally remain where
the condemnor takes only underground easements or surface ease-
ments, such as sewer line easements, which physically occupy so little
of the surface that substantial use remains with the fee owner. In
such cases compensation is determined by valuing the fee simple of the
strip before and after the imposition of the easement, the difference
being the value of the easement. 19 For example, if the strip that will
be subject to the easement is comprised of five acres worth $1,000
apiece, the value of the strip before condemnation is $5,000. If the
value of this same strip after the taking of the easement is only
$2,000, the property owner is entitled to compensation in the sum of
$3,000. The usual method for making this computation is the "bundle
of sticks" approach, i.e., to assume that all the rights in the strip of
land to be subjected to the easement constitute a bundle of rights or
sticks. The condemnor "takes" these rights (sticks) both by the acqui-
sition of the easement itself and by the imposition of restrictions upon
other uses of the property by the fee owner. The number of rights
taken and their importance are then equated to a percentage of the
fee value which theoretically reflects the value of the easement.
Experience shows that these percntages can constitute from 25 to 99
percent of the fee, depending upon the nature of the easement, its
width, the remaining use to the owner of the underlying fee, and the
highest and best potential use of the land taken.20
15 CAL. EVIDENCE CoD § 822 (a).
16 People v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).
'7 See id. (notice the cases cited therein).
Is Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hufford, 49 Cal. 2d 545, 319 P.2d 1033 (1957).
19 Id.
20 See G. ScHmuTz, CONDEMNATiON AppRAsAL HANDBOOK 204-15 (rev. ed.
E. Rams 1963).
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Where the public entity seeks to condemn an easement over land
already subject to an easement, the measure of the value of the second
easement is the difference in the value of th land before and after
the imposition of the second easement. If no substantial difference in
value is shown, the compensation for damage is only nominal.21
B. Method of Valuation When an Easement is Part of the Land Taken
by the Condemnor
If the property owner has an easement which provides access to
his land and that easement is taken, either alone or in conjunction
with lands which are part of the servient tenement, the formula for
determining the loss to the easement owner is to ascertain the fair
market value of his lands with and without the appurtenant ease-
ment. The difference between these values is the value of the ease-
ment.22 For example, if A's access to his 10-acre parcel is by ease-
ment across B's property and B's property, including A's easement,
is condemned, the measure of A's damage is the difference between
the value of A's land with and without the easement. In People v.
Logan23 the access to the defendant's parcel was by a 25-foot ease-
ment over the adjacent property. The Division of Highways con-
demned this adjacent strip in addition to a portion of the lands held
by the defendant in fee simple. The trial court's judgment was re-
versed because it could not be determined from the verdict what value
the jury had placed on the easement as distinct from the value which
it had placed on the land taken in fee simple. The court stated that
since the easement added to the value of the land owned in fee simple,
the value of such land could not properly be assessed without includ-
ing a compensable value for the easement. Ultimately, the major
part of the award was comprised of severance damages because of the
defendant's loss of access to his remaining land. In a more recent
case,24 the California Supreme Court has affirmed this position by its
reversal of a condemnation award where the trial court failed to
value separately an appurtenant water easement.
Another situation worthy of mention is where the value of A's
easement is worth substantially more than the value of the land it
encumbers. For example, the fee simple of B's land not subject to
easement may be worth $5,000 per acre, but the value of B's under-
lying fee which is subject to A's easement may have only nominal
21 Gilroy v. Felice, 221 Cal. App. 2d 259, 34 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1963);
People v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).
22 Hemmerling v. Tomley, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 572, 432 P.2d 697, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1967); People v. Logan, 198 Cal. App. 2d 581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1961).
23 People v. Logan, 198 Cal. App. 2d 581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1961).
24 Hemmerling v. Tomley, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 572, 432 P.2d 697, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1967).
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value, as where B obtains no use from the strip.25 By condemning
that portion of B's land subject to A's easement, the condemnor may
pay very little to B for his underlying fee but an amount in excess of
$5,000 to A for the taking of his easement. This is because the
measure of the value of A's easement appurtenant is its value to the
dominant tenement, and the loss is measured in the same way as are
severance damages. This situation is to be distinguished, however,
from the problem of valuing multiple interests in the same property
where the value of the interests cannot exceed the fee value of the
land.26
II. Partial Takings
Valuing the Take Where Only a Portion of the Whole is Taken
One of the more serious problems that has confronted courts,
attorneys, and appraisers has been the problem of establishing rules
for the valuation of condemned property which has been severed from
a larger tract. When an entire ownership is taken, the rules of valua-
tion are much simpler, not merely because there is no severance issue,
but because there is no problem in establishing the market value of
the property taken. For example, if an entire fee of 9.3 acres is con-
demned, sales comparable to the 9.3-acre parcel are admissible to
establish value. However, if 9.3 acres are taken from a ranch of 260
acres, there are at least three methods for computing the value of such
a parcel: (1) The entire 260-acre parcel can first be valued and the
9.3 acres then valued as a related part of the 260; (2) the value per
acre can be determined by averaging the entire 260-acre tract; or (3)
the 9.3-acre parcel can be valued as a completely separate unit. Un-
fortunately, the applicable sections of the California Code of Civil
Procedure do not indicate a preference for any particular method.
The general valuation rules applicable to partial takings, how-
ever, were brought together in the case of People ex rel. Department
of Public Works v. Silveira.2 7 In the Silveira case, the State sought to
25 The fee ownership of a strip subject to a right of way or access ease-
ment is of nominal value. Gilroy v. Felice, 221 Cal. App. 2d 259, 34 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1963); People v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).
If the owner of the underlying fee also uses the easement, it may have more
than nominal value, particularly if the strip is paved, gravelled or improved.
26 The value of all the ownership rights to a parcel of land cannot
exceed the market value of the fee simple as a matter of definition. People
v. S & E -oinebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal* App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53 (1956). The
condemnor has the right to have all ownership rights in a parcel which com-
prises the fee determined first between it and the various owners. CAL. CoDE
Civ. PRoc. § 1246.1. The owners in a second stage of the proceeding under the
code section are entitled to have the total value apportioned between their
respective interests.
27 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1965).
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condemn a strip of land 30 feet in width at the southerly end of the
Silveira Ranch and 850 feet in width at the northerly end. This area
included roughly 9.3 acres. Highway 101, which fronted the westerly
property line, was being widened with an overpass being constructed
at the northerly end of Silveira's property. (See Diagram, Appendix
"A"). The ranch was being utilized for agricultural purposes on the
valuation date but had potential for either a gas station site or multi-
family and single family residential purposes.
In valuing the affected property, the property owners' appraisers
used previous sales of both one-half and one-acre plots which had
been acquired for service station and commercial purposes along High-
way 101 in the general vicinity of the defendants' property, while the
State used sales of larger parcels comparable in size to the entire
ranch. The trial court allowed the smaller sales into evidence, over
objection by the State, and gave instructions to the jury to value the
part taken either as a separate and distinct 9.3-acre parcel of land
disconnected from the remainder or as a part of the entire 260-acre
ranch, whichever would produce the highest and greatest market
value to the owner.28 These actions of the trial court were affirmed
on appeal. In order to appreciate fully the significance of the hold-
ing of Silveira, however, it is necessary to explore first the various
valuation theories which were developed prior to Silveira and to de-
termine what departure, if any, was made from them.
The Rule Against Averaging
Even before Silveira, the rule was well established that in valu-
ing the part taken, the average value per square foot or per acre need
not be ascribed to the part taken, but the value of the entire parcel
could be apportioned disproportionately.29 This was and is known
as the "rule against averaging."
The application of the rule may be seen in the following illustra-
tion. Assume that a 100-acre parcel of land contains 10 acres of po-
tential commercial land fronting on a main street or highway, and 90
acres of back land with a potential use for single family residential
purposes. If commercial land is worth $10,000 per acre and residential
land is worth $1,000 per acre, the total parcel is worth $190,000, or
$1,900 per acre, on the basis of a mathematical average. If a public
entity seeks to condemn the 10 acres of frontage, the rule against
averaging denies the condemnor the ability to acquire those 10 acres
28 Id. at 616, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70 (instructions).
29 Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 59 Cal. 2d 333,
379 P.2d 493, 29 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1963); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v.
Silveira, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1965); People v. Loop, 127
Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954).
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at the average rate of $1,900 per acre. Since the front 10 acres are
commercially worth $10,000 per acre, the public agency should pay
the full $100,000 for the land so taken. Conversely, if the 10 acres
being taken are in the rear of the property, i.e., the area classified as
residential, the owner should receive $1,000 per acre, or $10,000 for
the total acreage, rather than the average value of $1,900 per acre or
$19,000. The rule requires the agency to pay and the owner to receive
the value of that which is actually taken.
Some appraisers on cross-examination defend the technique of
averaging by saying that purchasers in the open market pay average
or "across the board" prices for large parcels. This begs the issue
because in determining the value of the total property, appraisers and
purchasers normally give different values to different portions of the
whole depending upon what the different portions contribute to the
value of the whole. Obviously the acre containing a modern ranch
house and utility buildings contributes more value to the whole than
the acre of grazing land in a remote corner. Use, potential use, ter-
rain, access, and improvements are all considered in determining the
value of the whole and the contributions of the respective parts to
the whole. The so-called "across the board" price is the mathematical
average determined after the value of each separate parcel making up
the whole has been determined.
In People v. Loop30 the State sought to condemn a triangular
portion of the defendant's larger parcel. The condemned property
fronted Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, which was the access
street for the larger parcel. The appraisers for the landowner testi-
fied that the part taken was worth more per square foot than the
average square foot value of the property as a whole. The trial court
struck this testimony on the ground that the appraisers should have
valued the part taken using the average per square foot value assigned
to the entire parcel. The appellate court reversed the trial court and
stated:
The square foot method of valuation is based on the assumption that
each and every square foot of a parcel of property has the same value
as each and every other square foot. It is not a mandatory method of
valuation. The square foot method is a proper method of valuation
only when it can be said that each and every square foot of a parcel
has the same value as each and every other square foot.31
The State had further argued in the Loop case that the part
taken must be valued as part of the whole and that this required
averaging. The appellate court, however, rejected this argument with
the following language:
The reasoning of the state is delusive and deceptive. It is predicated
30 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954).
31 Id. at 796, 274 P.2d at 892-93.
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on a misconception of the meaning of the statement that the part
taken should be valued "as a part of the whole." The reasoning is
that this phrase means that parcel 5 must be valued according to its
proportional value of the whole-that is: the value of lots 52 and 53
must first be ascertained, the value of each square foot of lots 52 and
53 must then be computed, and the number of square feet in the part
taken must then be multiplied by such square foot value to determine
the value of the part taken. Such reasoning is fallacious. The phrase
"as a part of the whole" does not mean, as the state appears to con-
tend, "an average part of the whole." It means, as said in Yolo Water
& Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 186 P. 722, that in assessing the
value of the part taken the trier of fact is to consider the value of such
part arising from its availability for use in conjunction with the part
not taken.32
Affirmation of this principle of valuation is found in the later
decision of Hayward Union High School District v. Lemos,33 in which
the trial court refused the condemnor's motion to strike the testimony
of an appraiser who put different values on different portions of the
property sought to be taken. The appellate court affirmed, recogniz-
irg that in following the rule of valuing the part taken as part of a
larger tract it is proper to give different values to different portions
of ,the property. In other words, valuing as part of the whole does not
require giving the part taken an average value of the parcel of which
it is a part.
Finally, the California Supreme Court in the case of Los Angeles
County Flood Control District v. McNulty,34 gave its express approval
of the rule against averaging as formulated in the Loop and the
Hayward Union High School cases.
The Rule of Valuing the Take as Part of the Whole
Valuing the part taken as "part of the whole" means to value it in
conjunction with adjacent lands,35 i.e., as part of the whole piece of
which it is a part. This rule of valuation originally developed in
easement and right of way cases.
The problem was first considered by the California Supreme
Court in Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson.36 That case involved the
taking of a strip of land 10 feet wide along the defendant's entire
frontage on Clear Lake. The jury valued the 10 foot strip in conjunc-
tion with the adjacent lands of the defendant since the 10 foot strip,
taken by itself, had little value. Since the defendant also recovered
severance damages, the plaintiff asserted on appeal that the owners
32 Id. at 797, 274 P.2d at 894.
83 187 Cal. App. 2d 348, 9 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1960).
34 59 Cal. 2d 333, 379 P.2d 493, 29 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1963).
35 Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 186 P. 772 (1920);
People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Silveira, 236 Cal. App. 604, 46 Cal. Rptr.
260 (1965).
80 182 Cal. 48, 186 P. 772 (1920).
January 1969] VALUATION PROBLEMS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
had received a double recovery. First, it was argued, they obtained
compensation for the taking on the premise that the 10 foot strip could
be used in connection with the defendant's other lands, and second,
they obtained severance damages based on the interference with the
lands not taken.
The court properly rejected the argument with the following
language:
Appellant's argument in this behalf is based upon the obvious fallacy
that the value of the lands taken resulting from the possibility of their
use with the lands not taken is identical with the value of the lands
not taken resulting from the possibility of their use with the lands
taken. These respective values are, however, wholly separate and
independent .... 37
Although the court did not specifically identify and define the rule
of "valuing as part of the whole," it did, by such language, impliedly
identify the principle and approve its application.
In more recent cases, the validity of this rule has been upheld.
For example, in Napa Union High School Dist. v. Lewis,3s the appel-
late court stated that it would be unjust, and therefore fallacious, to
require the valuation of a 40 foot strip of land as a separate parcel
where a parcel of such shape would not be independently marketable.
A similar result obtained in Downey v. Royal 9 where the city sought
to condemn a strip of land 40 feet in width and 1,000 feet in length in
which third parties had surface and underground easements. The
property owner, while not seeking severance damages for this partial
taking, did argue that the narrow strip, when considered in conjunc-
tion with the other contiguous property, had a special compensable
value of its own as a parking lot and turning area. The condemnor
maintained that the market value of the easement-burdened land was
only nominal, and that any evidence as to the strip's value in relation
to the contiguous property was inadmissible because the property
owner had not asked for severance damages. The court, however,
citing the language of Yolo Water, upheld the condemnee's right to a
valuation of the strip which included consideration of the relationship
of the taken property to the remaining property.
Unfortunately, the dividing line between the rule that precludes
averaging and the rule which requires valuation as part of the whole
has, on occasion, been blurred and distorted. One case which has
caused such confusion is Los Angeles v. Allen,40 in which the court
failed to enunciate clearly the difference between these two rules.
The Allen case involved the taking of a strip of frontage land 33%
37 Id. at 54, 186 P. at 775.
38 158 Cal. App. 2d 69, 322 P.2d 39 (1958).
89 215 Cal. App. 2d 523, 30 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963).
40 1 Cal. 2d 572, 36 P.2d 611 (1934).
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feet wide and approximately 2,000 feet long to widen Santa Monica
Boulevard. Defendants owned a total parcel of 38.6 acres in addition
to such frontage land. (See Diagram, Appendix "B"). No evidence
was introduced to show the value which the frontage strip would
have had if separately owned and unconnected with the defendant's
remainder. The appraisal witnesses indicated that the portions of the
property remote from Santa Monica Boulevard were of less value
than the frontage.
The case was decided by referees who determined that the front-
age to a depth of 107 feet had a value of $1.64 a square foot and the
balance of the property had a value of 250 a square foot. The referees
then added together the values attributable to the two areas and
determined mathematically an overall average price. The part taken
was then valued at this weighted average, which was 320 a square
foot. Under the rule against averaging as stated in subsequent cases,
however, the condemnee would have received $1.64 a square foot for
the commercial frontage, rather than the 320.
The valuation rule utilized in Allen, however, has not even proved
acceptable to condemnors. Rather than accept such a weighted aver-
age approach, condemnors in situations similar to Allen argue that if
after the widening of a highway is completed the property which
fronts the newly widened highway is of the same commercial value
and depth as the property which previously fronted the highway, the
new frontage "substitutes" for the old and the owner should not be
compensated for any loss of frontage whatsoever. This rule has some-
times been referred to as the "frontage" rule41 or "zone of value"
rule. It has not been expressly adopted in California, although in
affirming the decision of the referees, the Court in the Allen case uses
reasoning supportive of the rule. The rule, however, ignores the
statutory concept of Code of Civil Procedure section 1248 which re-
quires separate valuation of the property sought to be condemned
and, for purposes of severance and special benefits, of the portion not
sought to be condemned. Moreover, the rule of separate valuation
was clearly stated in Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson,42 and further
enunciated in People v. Loop43 and People ex rel. Department of Public
Works v. Silveira.44 If the value of the take is separately assessed,
the de facto creation of a substitute frontage value should be ignored
in valuing the property in fact condemned, since it occurs only to the
remainder, after the taking is consummated.
41 Frenel v. Kentucky, 361 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
42 182 Cal. 48, 54, 186 P. 772, 775 (1920); see text accompanying note 37
supra.
43 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954).
44 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1965); see Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Hufford, 49 Cal. 2d 545, 319 P.2d 1033 (1957).
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For example, assume land worth 25 a square foot in the re-
mainder becomes worth $1.64 after condemnation because of a front-
age "shift." Since the increase in value occurs not to the property
taken but to the remaining property, this is, by definition, a "special
benefit" to the remainder. Code of Civil Procedure section 1248, as
construed by the cases, indicates that the place the damage occurs,
whether in the area taken or in the remainder, determines whether
the loss is compensated for as part of the take or as part of the sever-
ance damages to the value of the remainder.45 For instance, if the
area of the take includes a service station site, the presence of that
site must be recognized in valuing the take. If, after the taking, the
service station site shifts to the remainder, the presence of that site
must be considered in determining severance damages to the re-
mainder, which becomes an issue of special benefits. The effect of the
"frontage rule" is the offsetting of special benefits against the value
of the take, which is expressly forbidden under California statutory
law. 46
Moreover, if there is a frontage "shift" to the remainder, the
frontage rule says that the part taken is to be valued as an "average
part of the whole." This, however, conflicts with the well-established
rule against averaging, and it is doubtful that the dictum in the Allen
case can offset the strong acceptance and delineation of this latter
rule. Indeed, the Allen case itself seems vulnerable because it con-
fuses the rule against averaging with the rule of valuing as part of
the whole. Moreover, the court's rationale for affirming the referee's
finding is questionable. The court states that the values of the
frontage and the rear portions are arbitrarily chosen as a purely
mental operation. However, from the record this does not appear
correct. On the contrary, the frontage values to a depth of 107 feet
were based upon the actual development of the immediately adjacent
property. While appraising is always a mental operation, it is, hope-
fully, based upon factual patterns which can be readily verified from
observation of the market.
In conclusion, where the dimensions of a strip of land are such
that it has no independent marketability, the strip should be valued in
conjunction with contiguous lands of which it is legally a part. For
example, a 333 foot wide strip is too narrow to put buildings or
improvements upon when normal set backs are considered. However,
when used in conjunction with an adjoining 66V feet of land, the
property may have value as a parcel adaptable to commercial or other
uses. In valuing such property, the rule against averaging requires
45 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hufford, 49 Cal. 2d 545, 319 P.2d 1033
(1957).
46 CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 1248 (3).
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that we not determine a mathematical average, as the referees in
Allen did, unless the land taken is average. Moreover, the rule on
valuing as a part of the whole says that in valuing the part taken
such land be valued in conjunction with adjacent parcels adaptable to
the same use and under the same ownership.
The New Dimension of Silveira
Silveira adds a new dimension to these rules for valuing the part
taken. It first identifies and approves the rule against averaging.
It then correctly states the rule for valuing the taken property in
conjunction with abutting land when this is necessary to give the take
a value on the open market. The new dimension of Silveira is that it
provides that the part taken may be valued as if it alone were being
sold on the open market. Sales comparable to the part being taken,
therefore, may be used to value the take. No previous California
case had so held, and many condemnors had urged, as the State did in
Silveira, that the part taken should always be valued as part of the
whole and that sales should be comparable to the whole and not just
the take. Many trial courts had only admitted sales comparable to the
whole property, instructing juries in accordance with the pre-Sil-
veira contention of the condemnors. The effect was to tell the jury to
value the take at the price a purchaser would pay for the take if he
had to buy the entire parcel to get the take. The question was: What
would a purchaser pay for the 9.3-acre take if he had to buy the en-
tire 260 acre ranch to get those 9.3 acres? Obviously, however, the
9.3 acres would bring a higher price per acre if they were separately
conveyed than if they were sold only with the additional 250.7 acres.
Silveira upheld this latter procedure.
Another dimension of Silveira was the approval of instructions to
the jury to consider the value of the take either as part of the whole
or as a separate tract, and to return a verdict which produced "the
highest price." The classical definition of market value has always
assumed "the highest price" which the property would bring on the
open market,4 7 but this was the first instance of that definition being
applied to require the jury to use the valuation approach producing
the highest price.
In its refashioning of valuation rules for partial takings, however,
the appellate court in the Silveira case was required somehow to
hurdle the obstructing language of the Allen case which called for a
weighted average approach. The court accomplished this by distin-
guishing the two cases.
The result in Allen was just and proper under the particular facts of
47 Sacramento S.R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 412, 104 P. 979, 981 (1909).
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that case. But Allen does not stand for the proposition, as plaintiff
here asserts, that where the property sought to be condemned is a
part of a larger parcel, it must in all instances be valued as a part of a
whole, despite the fact that it may have a greater value as a separate
and distinct piece of property. 48
Justice Sullivan then correctly noted that the reason for the rule of
valuing the part taken as part of the whole did not logically apply to
all takes.
The requirement that the part taken must be valued as a part of the
whole and not as if it stood alone has been imposed because ordinarily
this relationship gives the part-particularly where it is a narrow
strip-a greater value. [Citations omitted]. This rule has been ap-
plied in order to protect the condenmee and assure him a just award
because otherwise the part taken would normally be useless and
valueless if considered by itself. [Citations omitted]. Since the rule
applied in the foregoing cases is obviously for the condemnee's bene-
fit, the instruction presently under examination violates neither its
letter nor spirit.4 9
This independent valuation of property that the owner could
have sold separately on the open market is only reasonable. For ex-
ample, if the owner could have sold a corner parcel fronting a main
highway as a service station site, he should be paid the value of such
a potential site by the condemnor even if the corner is presently part
of a 1,000-acre ranch. In such a case, sales of similar corner parcels
should be admitted as evidence of value rather than sales of 1,000-
acre ranches.50
The question, however, of whether the owner could have sold
the "take" as a separately valued parcel is one for the jury to decide.
For example, in People v. Neider,51 the owner contended that the
frontage of his entire parcel had a separate value for highway com-
mercial purposes while the remainder had a different value as a
shopping center site. The State asserted that the entire parcel was
usable only as a shopping center with no value differences existing
between the frontage and the remainder of the lands. The trial court
properly refused to instruct the jury to award the plaintiffs the higher
value reached by either (a) valuing the frontage strips taken as high-
way commercial land, or (b) valuing them as average parts of the en-
tire property. Such an instruction would have invaded the province
of the jury and would have forced them to accept the defendant's
contention that the site did, in fact, have a separate commercial value.
48 People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Silveira, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604,
618, 46 Cal. Rptr. 260, 271 (1965).
49 Id. at 619, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
50 It appears from the reasoning of the court in Silveira that if the 9.3-
acre take would itself be sold in smaller portions on the open market, such as
% acre and 1 acre units, that sales may be admitted to value such portions
of the take.
51 195 Cal. App. 2d 582, 16 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1961).
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Actually, a Loop instruction against averaging was proper, and
the proffered instruction was properly rejected as an incorrect state-
ment of the law. The Loop instruction leaves to the jury the deter-
mination of the factual dispute as to whether the quality of the part
being taken is average, better, or poorer than the remainder and thus
allows them to give the land taken its actual value. The instruction
rejected in Neider, however, tells the jury to average if it produces a
higher value than not averaging even if the land is poorer than the
average in quality.
Contrary to Neider, the court in Silveira held that the trial court's
instruction did not invade the jury's fact finding province. Never-
theless, that instruction did adopt the defendants' theory that the part
taken was independently marketable as a separate parcel and that
small sales should be used in valuing the part taken. Unfortunately,
the court in Silveira assumed that there had been a factual dispute
over whether the part taken was of such size, shape, and character
and had such access that it could have been sold as a separate parcel.
It is doubtful, however, that such a factual dispute was recognized
during the trial and argued to the jury. The State was undoubtedly
trying the case under the theory that the take had to be valued as
part of the whole, while the owners' attorneys were seeking to change
that rule. The instruction approved in Silveira, therefore, was so
broadly stated as to be a possible source of confusion.
Proper Interpretation and Application of the Silveira Rule
The instructions approved in the Silveira case direct the jury to
resolve the question whether the property being taken would bring
more as a separate and distinct parcel or as a fraction or part of the
whole, and, after making that determination, to base their valuation
on the formula which produces the highest award. Since the jury's
verdict must be based upon evidence which is in the case, 52 testimony
must be introduced that the property would bring more as a separate
parcel than it would bring as a part of the whole before the Silveira
instruction is appropriate. Conversely, the condemnor must adduce
evidence that the part taken does not have independent marketability
and therefore should be valued together with the defendants' other
lands before the issue is joined.
The issue will normally be raised during trial when the owner or
52 The only actual methods of proving values in a condemnation case
are by the opinions of qualified experts, the owner, or other admissible evi-
dence. CAL. EvmCEmc CODE § 813. Unless a sufficient showing is made to
create an issue of fact on a given point, an instruction on that issue is im-
proper and the matter is not for the jury's consideration. People v. Arthofer,
245 Cal. App. 2d 454, 54 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1966).
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his expert seeks to introduce evidence of sales comparable to the take.
At that time the court, in ruling on the admissibility of such sales,
will be required to make some preliminary determination as to
whether the take can be separately assessed. Unless the proper
foundation is laid the trial court should reject the concept of separate
valuation.53 Once the proper foundation is laid, however, the trial
court can then properly consider whether the take would be sale-
able as a separate and distinct parcel. The comparable sales offered
as evidence will themselves give some immediate indication of whether
parcels of such size, shape, and character as the take are separately
marketable. It is difficult to see, however, how long narrow strips
sought for easements and rights of way, such as a strip 332 by
2,000 feet, can be sold on the open market. Even if such sales have
occurred, the usual purchasers of such oddly-shaped parcels are public
bodies with the power of eminent domain, whose purchases are inad-
missible as comparable sales.
Once it has been determined, however, that the part taken should
be separately valued, sales comparable to the whole property will then
be needed by both parties for determining the amount of severance
damages. The danger arising here is that, if the smaller sales are
used to value not only the 9.3-acre take, but also the 251.7-acre re-
mainder, the value of the remainder will be substantially increased
as will the potential for larger severance damages. The trial court,
therefore, should caution the jury that consideration of the smaller
sales is limited to valuing the take and that only the large sales
should be considered in determining severance damages.
In addition, the Silveira rule is one which should principally
govern trial procedure during valuation phases. It should become an
instruction only in those very few instances where there is a real
factual valuation issue for the jury to resolve. If a party urges in-
structions against averaging together with the Silveira instruction,
great care will be needed to prevent the jury from becoming hope-
lessly confused. For instance, the condemnor is entitled to an instruc-
tion that the jury should value the part taken without averaging if
53 This would be similar to the judicial requirement that before an ap-
praiser can express an opinion on "reasonable probability of zoning change" a
sufficient foundation must be laid. People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369
P.2d 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962); People v. Arthofer, 245 Cal. App. 2d 454 54
Cal. Rptr. 878 (1966); Redondo Beach School Dist. v. Flodine, 153 Cal. App.
2d 437, 314 P.2d 581 (1957). Another example of a foundational requirement
is the rule that a trial court must find there is a substantial impairment of
access before severance damages based on damage to access can be con-
sidered. This, however, is a mixed question of fact and law for the court.
Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903
(1964); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); People v.
DiTomaso, 248 Cal. App. 2d 741, 57 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967).
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such part is poorer than the average. Such an instruction, however,
in the absence of proper judicial guidance, would be emasculated by
the Silveira instruction requiring the use of valuation formulae which
produce the highest value.
Returning briefly to the previous discussion on easements, since
these rights rarely sell on the open market, and since their dimensions
are usually odd when they do, it is difficult to visualize the applicabil-
ity of the Silveira rule to easement cases. Furthermore, the rule re-
quiring the valuation of the take as "part of the whole" originally
developed in easement and right-of-way cases. It is logical to con-
clude that this valuation rule will continue to govern in almost all
such cases.
IM. Conclusion
Rules of valuation, whether for condemnation of easements or
for partial takings, should have as their common goal the equitable
balancing of interests among individuals and public agencies. For
example, the rule that prevents averaging when the property being
taken is not average in value is a fair and desirable rule. Condemnors
should pay the actual value of the land they are taking, and landown-
ers should receive the value of what they have actually lost. Like-
wise, the rule that, in certain circumstances, gives the jury the duty
to value the part taken as a separate tract is also desirable since the
owner should get no less from a public entity then he would get from
a private party. Properly interpreted and applied, therefore, these
various rules of valuation can serve to further the general public
interest by enabling individual citizens to recover full and just com-
pensation.
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